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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
This section contains abbreviations of terms used throughout the research. 
AP Access Point  
ARP Address Resolution Protocol  
BYOD  Bring Your Own Device  
CDP Cisco Discovery Protocol  
C2 Command and Control  
DNS  Domain Name Service  
DHCP Dynamic Host Control Protocol  
FTP File Transfer Protocol  
HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol  
HTTPS Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure 
IT Information Technology 
IP Internet Protocol 
LAN Local Area Network  
MAC Address Media Access Control Address 
NAC Network Access Control  
PCAP Packet Capture  
PoE Power over Ethernet  
SE Social Engineering  
 
 
VLAN Virtual Local Area Network  
WAN Wide Area Network  




This section contains definitions of terms used throughout the research. 
Access point  Network infrastructure device capable of transmitting and receiving 
802.11 radio frequencies to facilitate wireless network access 
Address Resolution Protocol  Translates Layer 3 IP addresses to Layer 2 MAC address, 
facilitating communication between Layer 2 and 3. 
Attack  Also malicious activities, cyber-attack, hack  Any kind / multitude of exploits 
launched by a malicious user 
Attack surface  The collection of attack vectors a given device or service is susceptible 
to. 
Attack vector  This is a high level term to cover all kinds of attacks, methodologies and 
delivery methods 
Bring your own device  A trend in organizations, where employees are allowed to use 
their personal devices to access corporate resources. 
Cisco Discovery Protocol  A proprietary protocol that exchanges device information 
with other Cisco devices. 
Cloud enabled attack vector  An attack vector that utilizes cloud computing 
functionality to perform the attack or phases of an attack 
Cloud managed infrastructure  Physical infrastructure hardware (AP, switch, router, or 
firewall) that is controlled and managed through a cloud service.  This term within the 
paper refers mainly to Meraki devices. 
Command and control  Remotely controlling devices / software whether this 
functionality is built-in or gained through an exploit 
Controls  also security controls, physical controls, logical controls  any technology / 
solution that enforces an organizations written policies 
Domain Name Service  Translates named domains (i.e., google.com) to the 
corresponding Layer 3 IP address. 
 
 
Dynamic Host Control Protocol  A protocol used to manage and assign IP addressing to 
hosts.  When a host connects to a network it sends out DHCP requests at layer 2, the 
DHCP server then assigns a layer 3 IP address in the appropriate LAN / VLAN.  The host 
automatically configures its network adapters to gain network access. 
Eavesdropping  A passive attack where network traffic is monitored or collected for the 
purpose of extracting unencrypted data or traffic analysis. 
Exploit  An exploit is an attack that takes advantage of a specific vulnerability on target 
device / software. 
File Transfer Protocol  A protocol that facilitates file transfers between two hosts. 
Hypertext transfer protocol  A protocol that facilitate communications, commonly used 
to transfer data. 
Hypertext Transfer Protocol secure  A protocol that facilitate secure communications, 
encrypted HTTP protocol. 
Layer 2  Refers to the data link layer of the OSI model.  In this layer of the model data is 
switched in the form of frames and every communication is broadcast to all devices in the 
broadcast domain  or LAN segment.  Without a router no communication can leave the 
layer 2 broadcast domain.  
Layer 3  Refers to the network layer of the OSI model.  In this layer of the model data is 
routed in the form of a packet.  Routing allows communications between multiple LAN 
segments 
Local Area Network  The network infrastructure and devices that facilitate 
communications between devices owned or trusted by an organization, at a given site.  
Traditionally referred to when discussing wired infrastructure.  
Malicious user  also malicious attacker, attacker  An individual, internal or external, 
that has nefarious intentions.  Commonly the individual performing an attack. 
Media Access Control address  A unique hardware identification number, in the form of 
six groups of two hexadecimal numbers, assigned at the time of manufacture.  The MAC 
address facilitates layer 2 communications. 
Network Access Control  Any technology / solution that provides authentication and 
authorization functions for users / devices as they attempt to gain network connectivity 
Packet capture  refers to the act of recording and creating a file containing network 
traffic during and eavesdropping attack. 
Power over Ethernet  Transmission of electrical current through Ethernet cable to 
provide power for devices, such as phones or access points. 
 
 
Social engineering  Social engineering is a type of non-technical attack that focuses on 
exploiting unknowing individuals into providing sensitive data or perform an activity. 
Switch port  A layer 2 port on a switch.  For the purpose of this research, switch ports 
are used to connect RJ45 Ethernet cables between host and switch. 
Telnet  A protocol used to manage and administrate infrastructure devices. 
Trunk port  An operation mode of a switchport that allows all VLANs to transit.  The 
native VLAN on a trunk does not assign a VLAN identifier, or tag, so the native VLAN 
is deemed untagged traffic.  Any traffic sent without a VLAN tag will be placed on the 
configured native VLAN. 
Virtual Local Area Network  A logical, virtual LAN that resides on a physical LAN.  
This techniques allows for multiple VLANs to share the same physical resources while 
maintaining logical separation and segmentation. 
Wide Area Network  Traditionally the external, public facing aspect of the network.  
This includes internet, voice and private line circuits. 
Wireless Local Area Network  The network infrastructure that facilitates wireless 
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The purpose of this directed project and related research was to demonstrate and 
catalog a new attack vector that utilizes cloud managed infrastructure.  Cloud computing 
is a recent trend that is creating significant hype in the IT sector.  Being that cloud 
computing is a new theme in the computing world, there are many security concerns that 
remain unknown and unexplored.  The product of this directed project provides a 
documented taxonomy of the new attack vector and how to mitigate risk from this kind of 
attack. 
The new attack vector creates efficiencies throughout the lifecycle of an attack 
and greatly reduces time and effort for the malicious user; however, efficiencies in time 
and effort are not the only characteristics of the demonstrated attack vector.  This type of 
attack greatly increases the chance of success and reduces the odds of detection.  All of 
these characteristics culminate to create a tool for the malicious user that is dangerous to 
every organization in existence. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
As new technologies / methodologies are becoming available, security is in a 
continuous state of evolution.  This progression is not always a groundbreaking new 
exploit.  In fact, it can enable a well-versed exploit with a new delivery mechanism, (as is 
the case for this research).  The concepts of command and control and eavesdropping are 
by no means new to the information security community; however, they are proven and 
effective.  Providing these concepts with a new / innovative delivery method, which 
places them in the targeted network, and facilitates access to the network is a serious 
security concern.  The ability to perform information gathering from within the target 
network is the key concept to this attack vector.  This research will prove that using cloud 
managed infrastructure, as a delivery method, is effective and more efficient than the 
accepted taxonomy of a cyber-attack.   
 
This chapter introduces much of the background information for this directed 
project and related research by presenting the problem statement and associated research 
questions.  A review of the constraints of the study and defining terms used throughout 
the study will also be provided within.
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1.1 Statement of Problem 
 
With this new attack vector, a malicious user can rapidly perform information 
gathering to prepare for attack.  Once the attacker has gathered the information required, 
they can gain access to the target network  via cloud managed infrastructure - to launch 
any number of exploits.   
 
There are many solutions and technologies that can prevent unauthorized devices 
from accessing a network, such as Network Access Control (NAC).  These technologies 
are scarcely implemented due to cost and complexity.  A study of IT professionals 
indicates two of their biggest concerns regarding Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) is 
insufficient security controls, management, and visibility.  This implies that these 
organizations currently do not have a means to manage what devices should have access 
to their network (SANS Institute, 2014).  
 
1.2 Research Questions 
 
This paper is intended to answer the primary research question, as well as 




 Can cloud managed infrastructure be used as a hacking tool? 
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 How does this technology impact the accepted taxonomy of a cyber-attack? 




The scope of this research was limited to Meraki Access Points (APs), cloud 
managed infrastructure, which will facilitate the new attack vector.  All data sent, 
received or collected was simulated by the researcher to represent real world traffic - as it 
would be seen in production environments - as it travels through the network between 
two hosts.  No advanced techniques, analysis, exploits or encryption levels were used for 




The significance of this research was to identify a new cloud enabled attack 
vector and document its taxonomy.  This research will be used by security professionals 
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cloud technologies can be used maliciously will progress the maturity of cloud security as 




The assumptions for this directed project and surrounding research were as 
follows: 
 Cloud managed infrastructure has already been attached to the target network. 
 AP is connected to a Power over Ethernet (PoE) port on Layer 3 switch 
performing minimal routing. 
 The uplink port between switch and AP is enabled and is configured as a Layer 2 
trunk. 
 No NAC solution is in place. 
 





The following limitations were placed upon the research: 
 Research would not have been possible if target organization has sufficient 
physical / logical security controls in place. 
5 
 
 All results were based off of research performed in a laboratory environment and 
are assumed to accurately simulate production environments. 





Several delimiters were placed upon the research, which are as follows: 
 Research was limited to proving attack vector utilizing Meraki hardware only. 
 Research ceased at the point of launching targeted exploits. 
 The research did not attempt breaking encryptions or any other advanced 
techniques. 
 A Meraki MR24 AP, Cisco 1841 router, laptop running Microsoft Windows 8, 
desktop running Microsoft Windows 7 and a laptop running Kali Linux were used 
to emulate network traffic and to perform information gathering activities. 
 No Social attacks will be performed due to previous assumption that cloud 




CHAPTER 2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
As cloud computing continues to gain in popularity and prevalence, the potential 
attack surface increases with every service utilized.  Cloud security and best practices are 
still in their infancy and pose a moving target for security professionals.  Not only are 
their security considerations inherent to cloud computing itself, there are also 
considerations regarding how cloud technologies enable other attack vectors; by 
increasing the attack surface.  No organization is immune to cloud enabled attack vectors, 
even organizations that do not subscribe to any cloud services.   
 
This chapter provides context to the research throughout this paper.  The content 
work experience or training, which includes access to confidential materials. Specifically, 
we will discuss the anatomy of malicious attacks, delivery methodologies, several proven 
attacks, history and functionality of Meraki hardware. 
 
2.1 Anatomy of a Malicious Attack 
 
The SANS Institute defines the anatomy of an attack as summarized below 




1. Reconnaissance: Performing information gathering to understand architecture and 
find vulnerabilities.  
2. Weaponization: Planning the attack, choosing specific exploits for specific targets 
3. Delivery: Delivers packaged exploits created / identified in the Weaponization 
phase. 
4. Compromise: Delivered exploits are executed on targets. 
5. C2: Command and Control phase of the attack.  Exploit has been executed and 
infected devices are now communicating with / controlled by malicious 
individual.  Collection and staging of objective for extraction 
6. Exfiltration: Extract of target data / information and reducing footprint of exploit 
to avoid detection. 
With regards to the purpose of this research, the two primary phases that will be 




The reconnaissance phase of the anatomy is the most time consuming aspect of 
the attack.  In the phase significant amounts of time accumulate due to the malicious user 
having to find and identify vulnerabilities / lack of controls that will allow them to gain 
technical, non-technical or organizational knowledge on the target.  The attacker is 
looking for anything that will provide insight into architecture, network, host, security 







The delivery phase is characterized by positioning of exploits in desired location.  
Several common delivery methods currently in use include: Hyper Text Transfer Protocol 
(HTTP) tampering, drive-by download, code injection, thumb drives and emails 
containing malicious hyperlinks.  Regardless of delivery method, the object is the same, 
to transport packaged exploits to targets (Cloppert, 2009).   
 
2.2 Common Attack Methodologies 
 
This section will further discuss common attack methodologies that were used as 
part of this research; eavesdropping, Social Engineering (SE) and Command and Control 
effective time and again.  The delivery method used in this research breathes new life into 




Eavesdropping is a type of passive attack where the malicious user will observe / 
capture data as it flows through a network.  To perform eavesdropping in the most 
efficient manner, the attacker would ideally have a device attached to the target network.  
Once that is in place the attacker can perform traffic analysis to gain knowledge about 




policies or human information.  According to The National Institute of Standards and 
-120, through eavesdropping, an adversary 
can intercept a communication and, thus, access all unprotected information (Hoeper, 
2009).   
 
The interception of communications is facilitated by performing a Packet Capture 
(PCAP), which is a known resource to everyday IT staff and malicious users alike.  This 
is a mature tool / technology with a number of software providers that can perform PCAP 
and replay the information in the communication.  A successful and quick eavesdropping 
attack can achieve the entirety of the reconnaissance phase goals and limit chance of 
detection to a marginal amount.   
 
The information gathered will aid the weaponization phase of the attack as the 
potential targets have been identified and likely profiled.  In Special Publication 800-120 
NIST details certain attacks that can immediately follow traffic analysis; these are 
itemized below (Hoeper, 2009). 
Impersonation Attacks, in which an attacker assumes the identity 
of a legitimate party and attempts to convince a verifier that he is that 
party. Impersonation attacks are conducted through, but are not limited to, 
the following methods: 





 Man-in-the-Middle Attacks, in which an adversary may replay, relay, 
reflect, interleave and/or modify messages in one or more protocol 
executions between two parties to fool at least one of those parties 
about the identity of the other party; 
 Replay Attacks, in which an adversary replays messages from a 
previously-observed protocol execution; 
Extraction of Authentication Credentials, in which an adversary 
tries to get information about the long-term authentication credentials. 
This can be done through: 
 Dictionary Attacks, in which an adversary breaks a weak password 
and uses it in subsequent sessions; 
 Chosen-Text Attacks, in which an adversary strategically chooses 
challenges in an attempt to extract information about 
long-term credentials. 
It can be observed that impersonation attacks can be conducted at 
the protocol level (e.g. man-in-the-middle attacks) and/or at the 
cryptographic level (e.g. extraction of authentication credentials). 
 Key Extraction Attacks, in which an adversary obtains secret keying 






2.2.2 Social Engineering (SE) 
 
SE is an attack that is aimed at the people aspect of an organizations security 
policy.  The definitio
paper; Social Engineering: A Means To Violate A Computer System (Allen, 2006).   
information by manipulation of legitimate users. A social engineer will 
commonly use the telephone or Internet to trick a person into revealing 
sensitive information or getting them to do something that is against 
typical policies. By this method, social engineers exploit the natural 
tendency of a person to trust his or her word, rather than exploiting 
 
 
SE attacks are hugely successful in comparison to other techniques used to 






2.2.3 Command and Control (C2) 
 
Not only is C2 a phase in the accepted taxonomy of a cyber-attack, it is also a 
form of attack as well.  C2 attacks allow a malicious user to operate devices / software 
remotely.  This method gives the attacker the ability to perform any activities the device / 
software is capable of within the target network, at their discretion.  With regard to the 
research at hand, the researcher will be using C2 functionality  via cloud managed 
 
 
Traditionally, C2 attacks were performed utilizing Internet relay chat protocol 
however, this method allowed for easy detection and identification of infected hosts and 
attacker information.  Several new methods are becoming popular including HTTP, 
HTTPS, peer to peer and social networking.  These new methods add a layer of 
obfuscation to the attack that makes the communication streams between command 
source and infected host indistinguishable from normal traffic on the network (Stephens, 
2010). 
 
2.3 Meraki: Cloud Managed Infrastructure 
 
Meraki is the leader in cloud managed networks, with wireless, switching, 
security, and mobile device management products built from the ground up, to be 




was started by two students; Sanjit Biswas and John Bicket.  Roofnet was intended to 




Meraki, as a company, was founded in 2006 by the original two MIT students in 
creation.  Meraki, from its inception has boasted significant levels of growth, at two to 
was acquired by Cisco.  Meraki, while maintaining its name and product has additionally 
become the Cisco Cloud Network Group (Meraki, 2015). 
 
Meraki is known for their simple and easy to use out of band cloud management 
architecture that lets you monitor, configure and control your network from anywhere in 
on of the controller, which is accessed through the 
cloud portal: dashboard.meraki.com. 
 
Meraki has gone through many changes as the company has matured.  Up until 
February 2008, when they updated their End User License Agreement (EULA), Meraki 
was a hacker friendly company.  The product was built using open source technologies 




hardware.  With the updated EULA, Meraki forbid using any software other than 
 down the hardware to prevent such actions (Gearhart, 2008).   
 
2.3.2 Meraki Functionality 
 
Meraki has custom built their hardware and software with one driving principal, 
simplicity.  They boiled down all of their advanced configuration details and feature sets 
to a couple checkboxes and radio buttons, all without any loss of major functionality.  
This section will reveal how the Meraki hardware operates and will perform in the 
laboratory. 
 
When you receive a Meraki AP, switch or firewall the first thing to do is to 
connect it to the internet.  Plug the AP into a Power over Ethernet (PoE) switch, the AP 
gets an IP address from Dynamic Host Control Protocol (DHCP).  At this point the cloud 
managed infrastructure attempts to reach the cloud based controller.  Once 
communications with the cloud based controller is established, the hardware then checks 
for any updates that are available.  If an update is available, it will be downloaded, 
installed and rebooted.  If no update is needed, or after the reboot, the AP connects to the 
cloud controller and downloads the current configuration.  From that point forward, the 
device is able to be remotely controlled through cloud management feature.  The 






The device communicates with the dashboard through HTTPS.  This traffic is 
rarely blocked by firewalls or access-lists due to the prevalence of the protocol.  Nearly 
every networked device uses HTTPS to communicate with the Internet, so the traffic is 
deemed safe and generally does not draw much attention.  Many firewalls permit traffic 
from more secure zones (internal networks) to less secure zones (external networks) as 
default out of the box behavior.  However, in the scenario where an organization has very 
tight access controls and locks down outbound traffic, there is a chance that the 
communications would not be permitted. 
 
class of its own.  Once logged into the dashboard, and administrator would immediately 
have access to live troubleshooting tools such as PCAP, ping, trace route, throughput and 
wired VLAN monitoring  DNS, ARP, and DHCP  as well as location analytics, layer 3 
/ 7 firewall, traffic analytics, host identification, topology and RF spectrum monitoring.  
All of these features are present in the dashboard.  The dashboard is also what facilitates 
the C2 component of cloud enabled infrastructure, being that commands / configurations 
are given to the commander - dashboard - and those commands are propagated to the 
infrastructure under its control.    
 
Meraki makes configuration of APs relatively simple, and in that simplicity lies 
an unintended source of obfuscation for the attacker.  Default behavior of the APs are 
such that the AP is placed into the VLAN of the connected switch port.  The AP receives 




associating to the device; this is called Meraki DHCP.  The address an associated client 
will receive is a random IP address in a unique 10.0.0.0 /8 network.  When the associated 
the Meraki AP.  With this configuration all a
exist to suit the needs of an organization.   
 
It is also important to understand how the different types of traffic flow through 
the LAN / WAN.  The two types of traffic being referred to are the control / management 
plane and the data plane.  The control and management plane will carry configurations, 
statistics and monitoring information.  The data plane carries all user traffic.  In the 
Meraki model, the control and management plane data is sent encrypted to the cloud 
while the data plane is forwarded out to its intended destination.  Figure 1 below 









This chapter has discussed the critical concepts and methodologies used 
throughout this research.  The accepted taxonomy of a cyber-attack was detailed to 
provide a reference point of how this taxonomy changes using the cloud enabled attack 
vector discussed later in the paper.  Background information on the various types of 
proven attack methods that will be utilized in the research was provided.  Finally, insight 
into the history of Meraki and how their cloud managed infrastructure operates was 
touched upon.  This section lays the foundation of knowledge used throughout the rest of 




CHAPTER 3. PROCEDURE 
This section details the methodology, phases and steps used to perform the 
research for this directed project.  
anatomy of an attack, each step of the procedure followed the six phases as identified in 
Chapter 2.  The objective of each phase was relative to its given function.  The actions 
that were taken in each phase of the new cloud enabled attack vector will be revealed as it 
is discussed through this chapter.  Any process or function of a phase that was not 
performed, with regard to assumptions and scope will be discussed.  The phases of this 
experiment were: 
 
1. Phase 1 reconnaissance: Gain physical access or perform SE to get Meraki 
hardware attached to target network.  
C2 functionality, to acquire as much data as possible. 
2. Phase 2 weaponization: Determine high value targets and prepare packaged 
exploits such that the exploit lines up with the information from previous phase, 
such as: operating system, services, patch levels or vulnerabilities. 
3. Phase 3 delivery: 
functionality to change AP configuration, enabling an SSID, facilitating direct 




4. Phase 4 compromise: Packaged exploits deployed and targets compromised 
5. Phase 5 C2: Either use C2 as in reconnaissance or delivery phases to facilitate 
staging of attack objective, or use C2 in the traditional sense on infected targets of 
the compromise phase. 
6. Phase 6 exfiltration: Export objective of attack, retrieve Meraki AP and cover / 




In the lab environment there were three VLANs to demonstrate information 
gathering capabilities across logically separated networks.  VLAN assignments were 
determined at random with no logical foundation.  All of devices were connected to a 
trunk ports with the native VLAN being that of the host; with the exception of layer 3 
routed ports.  The cloud managed AP was attached to the network with all radios disabled 
and the Ethernet interface enabled. 
 
Once the Attack AP was communicating with the dashboard the researcher 
simulated network traffic; Telnet, FTP and HTTP.  These communication flows were 
collected by the attack laptop, using the PCAP functionality of Meraki AP and 






For the intent and purpose of this research it ws assumed that infiltration and 
placement of Meraki hardware on target network to have already taken place.  While the 
AP was sitting on the target network in stealth, the dashboard s troubleshooting tools 
were used to gather information pertaining to the network and its host.  Immediately after 
obtaining a DHCP lease network information such as default gateway, subnet, LAN / 
WAN IP addressing and CDP information became available to the researcher.  
Additionally, Meraki APs monitor the status of DHCP, DNS and ARP requests on every 
VLAN that is visible.   
 
Connecting the cloud managed infrastructure into a trunk port allowed it to obtain 
and monitor all active VLAN information seen.  Additional network information was 
determined using the built in tools: PCAP, ping, trace route and access to the ARP table.  
Wireshark was used to capture, extract and playback data collected from PCAPs, 
providing the researcher with access to any unencrypted data. 
 
Several scenarios exist where a malicious user could potentially attach cloud 
managed infrastructure on the target network; they are as follows: 
 
 Social engineering 
 Insider attack 





Due to the overwhelming success rate of SE alone, claimed to be 100% effective, 
it was assumed that almost any external party would be able to attach cloud managed 
hardware on the target network if they had the resolve.  If not through use of SE, an 
external party can still gain access to a facility through poor physical security controls.  
These two approaches require very little technical skill and rely on the lack of physical / 
logical controls. 
 
Nearly all barriers faced by an external party are removed in the inside attacker 
scenario, as these individuals would be an employee or contractor, and have authorization 
to the building and network.  Additionally, it was assumed that a hardwired Ethernet 
connection is provided in their workspace.  Logical security would be the obstacle for the 
inside attacker to overcome.  We have a great example of the inside attacker in Edward 
Snowden.  Snowden was not an employee of the NSA; rather he consulted for them while 
with Dell and Booz Allen Hamilton.  Despite not being an NSA employee he was given 
sweeping authorizations to their systems and infrastructure.  He did not like what the 
NSA was doing so he abused those authorizations and went public with many classified 




Weaponization is the next phase in th .  No actions 
were taken by the researcher in this phase due to scope.  It is in this phase that the 




exploits will be paired and packaged to a specific target.  The pairing of the exploit to 
target and overall success is directly influenced by the quality of information gained in 
the previous phase.   
 
At this point the AP was still configured with its radio interfaces disabled to 
maintain anonymity.  A mildly skilled attacker should be able to complete the 
weaponization phase through the use of free, ethical hacking tools.  MetaSploit, a 
software with massive libraries of exploits, could be used to package exploits to specific 
vulnerabilities, assuming the attacker has identified vulnerabilities on the target.   
 
Now that the malicious user had a strong understanding of the network topology, 




The delivery methodology will be utilized in this phase to transport packaged 
exploits to their target.  In the case of this research, the delivery method revolves around 
the C2 functionality of cloud managed infrastructure.  The researcher enabled the 
delivery method by configuring a WLAN that was broadcast by the Meraki AP.  The 
attacker connected to the WLAN which provided direct network access, bypassing 





Depending on the facility and AP location, this does not require physical access to 
the facility.  Through the use of custom antennae the attacker can increase the maximum 
distance from the facility.  Once all payloads were delivered, the researcher disabled the 




This phase was not performed by the researcher as it is outside of the established 
scope.  The compromise phase is the point where the targeted exploits and malicious 
software would be deployed within the target ecosystem.  Whether these exploits or 
software are meant to take down target resource, install malware, infect more hosts for 
additional C2 resources or steal personal / intellectual property is of no relevance to this 




The researcher took no action during this phase.  With regard to the taxonomy, 
this phase would have require the use of C2 to control hosts infected during the 
compromise phase.  With the proposed cloud enabled attack vector, the C2 phase may be 







The exfiltration phase was also outside the scope of what was performed in the 
research.  There are still several things that need accomplished in this phase.  Extraction 
of attack objective is the critical component in this phase.  In the research scenario this 
was  secondary 
objectives of this phase were to cover the tracks of the attack.  Removal of the AP was 
the primary focus and should likely be able to be performed in the same fashion as 
attaching it to the network.  In general, eliminating the digital fingerprint of the attack 




CHAPTER 4. RESULTS 
This chapter contains the results from research performed using the procedure 
discussed in Chapter 3.  In addition to the findings, this chapter will also discuss several 
caveats identified will performing research. 
 
4.1  Findings 
 
The findings from the research represent proof of the proposed hypothesis and 
repertoire.  Not only does the cloud 
managed infrastructure enable discrete, advanced information gathering in a fraction of 
the time, it also facilitates a means to gain access to the target network to launch any 
exploit desired; all with ease.  To add insult to injury, the AP provides some level of 
obfuscation to the attack and limits chance of detection by extracting data over LAN / 
WLAN instead of utilizing WAN.   
 
Figure 4-1 below depicts the lab architecture, IP addressing and VLAN 









For this phase of the attack the Meraki MR24 attack AP was connected to a trunk 
port on a layer 3 switch.  The configuration for the port was left at the factory default; 
trunk port with VLAN 1 native.  Device configurations are attached in the Appendices.  
Where the AP is attached to the network makes a difference as to the information that 
could be collected.  This will be further discussed in the Caveats section at the end of this 
chapter.  For the sake of the research, the attack AP was connected in the ideal location as 





In the reconnaissance phase, the researcher simulated the flow of information 
across the network and used the Meraki AP / dashboard to perform PCAPs.  The 
researcher triggered telnet, FTP and HTTP communications, all of which were 
successfully collected by the PCAP.  The sensitive data contained in these captures was 
extracted using WireShark. 
 
4.1.1.1 Telnet Communications 
 
Figure 4-2 below shows telnet communication flows and Figure 4-3 depicts the 
Windows 8 laptop to facilitate the telnet session.  The blue text is data sent from router to 
host and red texts is data from host to router.  Not only did this passive attack capture 






Figure 4-2: Simulated Telnet Traffic 
 
 




4.1.1.2 FTP Communications 
 
Figure 4-4 and 4-5, below, depict the capture of sensitive FTP data.  FileZilla FTP 
server was installed on the Windows 8 laptop and facilitated the file transfer.  Figure 4-4 
-5 displays the sensitive data 
extracted via WireShark.  The same router and host that were used to simulate Telnet 
traffic were again used to simulate FTP traffic.  Again, we capture credentials that allow 
access to the FTP server, specific product, version and files that are being transferred.  In 
this example the transfer fails, but that is irrelevant as the sensitive data was collected. 
 





Figure 4-5: WireShark FTP Data Extraction  
 
4.1.1.3 HTTP Communications 
 
The final sensitive information collection performed was HTTP traffic.  For this 
scenario an IIS webserver was enabled on the Windows 8 laptop with directory browsing 
open to everyone with read / write permissions.  This was configured to facilitate file 
transfers via HTTP protocol.  No authentication was configured on the service. 
 
Figure 4-6, 4-7 and 4-8 depict the traffic flow and data extraction for this exercise.  
The packet capture collected all data transferred, figure 4-7.  Copying that data into a 




the user would have experienced it, figure 4-8.  This again enabled the researcher to not 



























Figure 4-6: Simulated HTTP Traffic 
 
 









Moving into the weaponization phase of the attack, the researcher has already 
amassed a very substantial amount actionable intelligence.  Despite not having performed 
any analysis or exploits as a part of this research, it is apparent how the researcher could 
use this information.   
 
Outside of the sensitive data discussed in the reconnaissance section, the 
researcher is also aware of what products and versions are offering services.  That 
information by itself is enough for the researcher to line up and narrow exploits to a much 
smaller selection.  Access to several file directories in the network is also available if the 
attack objective is intellectual property.  In addition to the more advanced exploits, the 
researcher also has a wealth of layer 2 information from the packet captures that would 







Assuming the researcher had the output of the weaponization phase, exploits 
packaged and ready for distribution, getting the exploits to the target devices would be 
the result of this phase.  Fortunately, the C2 nature of Meraki APs makes this feat very 
simple.  The researcher enabled a WLAN on the attack AP to allow direct network access 
without having to gain physical access to the facility. 
 
One defining characteristic of this attack vector is bypassing the WAN for 
delivery, instead delivering via LAN / WLAN.  This component further reduces chances 
of detection as traffic will not be transferred through edge devices.  Traditionally, 
Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) technologies and other monitoring / reporting 
solutions either live or have a sensor on perimeter devices.  Delivery via this method 
would allow for the use of exploits that might normally be blocked by an IPS due to its 




No actions were performed by the researcher for this phase due to scope.  This 
phase is assumed to be relatively unaffected, in function, by the methodology of the new 





The compromise phase would take place immediately after delivery phase was 
completed.  At this point, the researcher has unhindered network access and can associate 
any number of devices to the attack AP.  These devices would be implementing the 
exploits that were identified in the weaponization phase.  Once the exploits were 




This phase was also out of scope to the research.  With respect to the new attack 
vector this phase may not even be necessary.  Since this attack vector allows for direct 
network access, a slave device might not be needed if objectives can be accomplished in 
delivery / compromise phases.  If more advanced techniques were being used, researcher 
would be controlling newly infected machines to stage objective of the attack for 




To begin this phase, the researcher enabled and connected to the WLAN on the 
attack AP.  Network access was used to extract attack objectives.  After successful 
extraction of data, the next step was to retract the attack AP from the facility.  If building 
e company 




SE attack with the same individual could be used to have the exploited individual remove 




There are several caveats that came to light through the research and laboratory 
exercises that are important to note.  First and foremost, attaching an attack AP to a 
network does not guarantee the results of this research.  Secondly, there are some pitfalls 
in the reconnaissance phase and some precautionary steps that should be executed to 
increase the chance of a successful infiltration.    
 
4.2.1 Successful Reconnaissance Phase 
 
It is important to note that the overall success of the attack is based upon getting 
the AP attached to the appropriate device in the infrastructure.  This can be a difficult 
task as a malicious outsider would be connecting the AP to a network drop somewhere in 
the office space with no knowledge of where the drop is terminated.  If the AP is attached 
directly to a layer 2 device a packet capture will provide only layer 2 level information.  
While this would still provide a wealth of knowledge, it does not provide any insight into 





4.2.1.1 Attack AP Location 
 
Ideally, the AP should be attached to the core layer 3 switch, performing routing.  
As previously stated, there is no guarantee where the AP is being attached if you do not 
have access to the networking closet or knowledge of network drop termination.  While 
this seems like a relatively significant pitfall there are several trends and technologies the 
researcher has observed in the field that will increase the likelihood of attaining an 
agreeable point of attachment.  These enabling trends and technologies revolve around 
virtual switch stacks, large switch chassis with multiple switch blades and route 
processors as well the tendency of organizations to put PoE switches in place as the core.  
Additionally targeting a smaller offices or satellites would likely prove more successful 
than larger offices. 
 
Switch stacks and large switch chassis increase the likelihood of finding an 
appropriate place to attach an Attack AP.  These large chassis and stacks greatly reduce 
network administration by having one logical device, in the case of switch stacks, or a 
multitude of blades in a chassis managed by a supervisor blade.  In these types of 
deployments were each IDF services a large number of clients, it would be beneficial to 
network performance to route traffic at layer 3 between MDF and IDFs instead of layer 2 
switching.  This increases the number of broadcast domains and limits the propagation of 





4.2.1.2 Mitigating Failure 
 
There are several considerations that can increase the chances of having a 
successful attack.  To mitigate the risk of failure due to attaching to the attack AP to a 
non-PoE port, the attacker would either have a power adapter on their person - if they 
were to exploit physical security - or provide it with the AP in the SE approach.  This 
precognition can prevent a scenario where the attacker cannot find a PoE port and avoid 
drawing unneeded attention to themselves as they wander around the office space looking 
for one. 
 
Additionally, the researcher believes that smaller offices would make better 
targets as it is more likely that they would be supported through a single network closet 
and the equipment would be a PoE capable switch.  It is also assumed that this single 





CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
In summation of this research, and answering the primary research questions; yes, 
a Meraki AP is a very useful, efficient hacking tool capable of passive information 
gathering attacks and enabling on demand delivery methods.  As cloud technologies 
improve efficiencies and streamline IT as a whole for organizations, it will offer those 
same benefits to nefarious individuals.  With minimal effort and time, massive amounts 
of relevant information can be gathered in near real time from within a  traditionally - 
trusted security zone.  Collecting information from within the internal network provides a 
better opportunity for the attacker to collect sensitive data, as there is less security 
controls in place.  This research also provided plentiful insight into the secondary 
research questions as well which will be discussed in the following sections. 
 
5.1 Impact on Taxonomy 
 
The first secondary research question asks what the impact to the generally 
accepted taxonomy of a cyber-attack would be.  While the taxonomy of the cloud enabled 
cyber-attack has many similar characteristics there are several glaring differences 
between the two and some blending of separation between phases.  The amount of time 




traffic analysis will be reduced significantly as well as provide better results.  The 
researcher predicts the amount of time and effort would be halved, at a minimum.  Also, 
the new delivery methodology increases the likelihood of success. 
 
This reduction of effort / time is a byproduct of the answers to the two primary 
research questions in addition to relying on SE to facilitate the reconnaissance phase.  As 
discussed previously, SE is incredibly successful and should not take long to get the 
attack AP attached to the internal network.  Once the device is behind the hardened 
network perimeter the potential for a successful attack increases significantly.  This 
increase is expected for two reasons; the device is in a trusted zone as stated, and there is 
less of a chance to be detected in one of the early phases.  If an organization is only 
concerned with monitoring their perimeter, this new attack vector would essentially put 
the attacker in their blind spot; this is especially true regarding delivery / compromise / 
exfiltration phases. 
 
5.2 Mitigation Techniques 
 
Addressing the final Research Question regarding prevention of this newly 
identified attack vector, mitigation of this attack vector to a marginal level is entirely 
possible.  However, it would be a costly and time intensive endeavor.  The best way to 
prevent this attack vector, and many others, is through the utilization of a Network 







This type of solution would require authentication and authorization in the form 
of directory lookup / credential verification, Certificates or MAC address.  While these 
methods are not 100% effective the researcher would argue that the solution is proficient 
enough to stop all but a truly educated, determined attacker.   
 
Not only would a NAC solution protect from a malicious external party it would 
also provide protection from a malicious insider.  With the prevalence of BYOD and 
insider attacks it should be argued that every organization implement stringent security 
policies in addition to NAC.  There are still ways to bypass a NAC solution.  For 
example, if a malicious insider was aware of the NAC solution, collecting a MAC 
address and spoofing that MAC is trivial.  Acquiring credentials or certificate fraud 
would allow you to masquerade as an authorized individual.  However, if there is a 
security policy enforced by NAC to limit access to network resources as required, the 
impact of this kind of attack can be mitigated. 
 
5.2.2 Best Practices 
 
Outside of a large project to implement a NAC solution, simply following 
industry best practices can successfully mitigate the risk to a lower level.  Several of 




native for trunk ports, disabling plain text communications and services would also be an 
effective deterrent.   
 
5.2.3 Block Communications 
 
In the case of Meraki there is another method that could be employed.  If there is 
no Meraki equipment in your network, simply blocking traffic destined to the Meraki 
cloud would be effective.  However, this methodology applies only to the specific cloud 
enabled attack vector identified in this work.  This approach would likely not be feasible 
offering.  Blocking traffic to these destinations could have an unintended impact upon 
your employees and business applications that tie into these clouds. 
 
5.3 Future Work 
 
Through the course of the research we have demonstrated the power and 
credentials should be a 
serious concern for any organization that currently has Meraki infrastructure deployed in 
their networks.  While Meraki does have two factor authentication, in practice this is 
poorly adopted.  If a malicious user were able to gain 
dashboard they would be able to execute the attack vector laid out in this paper.  In 
addition, this would bypass any NAC solution in place, there is even less chance of 




dashboard?  Several concepts appear feasible, including: proxy attack, session hijacking, 
 infrastructure. 
 
Following a similar procedure for this research, is it possible to run an evil Twin 
or captive portal type of attack during the reconnaissance phase to gather credentials.  
Meraki does have captive portal and 802.1x authentication functionality.  The ability to 
implement these types of attacks into the reconnaissance phase would increase the 
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Current configuration : 1728 bytes 
! 
version 12.4 
service timestamps debug datetime msec 












aaa authentication login LOGIN local 
aaa authorization exec default local if-authenticated 
! 







ip dhcp use vrf connected 
! 
ip dhcp pool LAB-DATA 
   network 172.16.0.0 255.255.255.0 
   dns-server 4.2.2.1 8.8.8.8 
   default-router 172.16.0.1 
! 
ip dhcp pool MGMT-NET 
   network 10.0.0.0 255.255.255.0 
   dns-server 4.2.2.1 8.8.8.8 
   default-router 10.0.0.1 
! 




   network 192.168.0.0 255.255.255.0 
   default-router 192.168.0.1 
   dns-server 4.2.2.1 8.8.8.8 
! 
! 











 ip address 10.255.255.253 255.255.255.252 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/1 
 no ip address 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/1.1 
 encapsulation dot1Q 1 native 
 ip address 10.0.0.1 255.255.255.0 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/1.2 
 encapsulation dot1Q 2 
 ip address 172.16.0.1 255.255.255.0 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/1.3 
 encapsulation dot1Q 3 
 ip address 192.168.0.1 255.255.255.0 
! 
ip route 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 10.255.255.254 
! 
! 
ip http server 
ip http authentication local 
no ip http secure-server 
! 













line con 0 
line aux 0 
line vty 0 4 
 access-class 1 in 
 transport input all 
line vty 5 15 
 access-class 1 in 
 transport input all 
! 





APPENDIX B.  MERAKI DASHBOARD: ATTACKER CONFIGURATIONS AND 
PACKET CAPTURE 
 
Figure 5.3-1: Attack AP WLAN Availability in Reconnaissance Phase 
 










APPENDIX C.  MERAKI DASHBOARD: LAB CONFIGURATIONS 
 
Figure 5.3-1: Meraki MS220 Layer 2 Switch Switchport Configuration 
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